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AN ABSENCE THAT COUNTS IN THE WORLD:
MERLEAU-PONTY’S LATER PHILOSOPHY OF TIME
IN LIGHT OF BERNET’S “EINLEITUNG” 1
ALIA AL-SAJI
In his “Einleitung” to Edmund Husserl’s Texte zur Phänomenologie des
inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), translated for the first time in this
volume,2 Rudolf Bernet convincingly argues for an alternative order and
grouping of Husserl’s early texts on time — texts originally published as
“Supplementary Texts” (Part B) in the critical edition of Husserl’s Time
Lectures in Husserliana X: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
(1893-1917).3 Most significantly, Bernet situates these texts within the context
of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology and brings to light not only
their philosophical import but also their limitations and blind spots. By means
of Bernet’s re-reading and reconstruction, Husserl’s early analyses of time
come to reveal tendencies and directions of thought that are otherwise
obscured by the organization of the Time Lectures themselves. As is now well
known, the “Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal
Time” (originally published in 1928 and republished as Part A of the critical
edition in 1966) were edited by Edith Stein and nominally by Martin
Heidegger and juxtapose texts from different periods of Husserl’s thought on
time between 1893 and 1917;4 this collage effectively masks the philosophical
and terminological shifts within Husserl’s phenomenology of time-
consciousness. What is masked is precisely that “unthought-of element” of
Husserl’s analyses that Maurice Merleau-Ponty was to find so productive; this
is Husserl’s constant self-questioning and rethinking of earlier positions, the
divergence and revision that reveal his thought as a process in the making.5 In
taking up and re-ordering the “Supplementary Texts” from Husserliana X,
Bernet’s “Einleitung” makes visible the stakes implicit in the movement of
Husserl’s thought on time, both in the continuities upon which it insists and in
the transformations it enacts. The “Einleitung” reveals reiterations but also
differences within Husserl’s own thinking of time; it exposes the articulations,
hesitations and sometimes even the worries that make the concepts central to
Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness — concepts of retention,
primal impression and absolute consciousness — what they have become for
us.
As Bernet notes, Husserl’s time-analyses have been a generative, albeit
contested, ground for later French phenomenologists for whom the critique of
these analyses has constituted an indispensable point of departure in their own
thinking of time (“Einleitung,” lxiii). Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a curious case
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in this regard. Though Merleau-Ponty presents his account of temporality in
the Phenomenology of Perception as one that follows closely from Husserl’s
Time Lectures, the temporality which he elaborates throughout that text is one
that is characterized as much by “dehiscence”6 as by “envelopment” (PhP
140/164) and interlocking (“emboîtement”) (PhP 240/278). This double
reading of retentional intentionality, as the temporal movement both of
disintegration (PhP 419/479) and of return and presence to self (PhP 427/488),
paradoxically demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s closeness to Husserl. For the
author of the Phenomenology the Husserlian framework is one that remains
too close. Merleau-Ponty thinks within this framework, drawing out its
implicit yet undeveloped possibilities, but I would claim that Merleau-Ponty
does not scrutinize the framework itself. His reading in the Phenomenology is
at once faithful to, while diverging from, Husserl, yet unlike his approach in
later texts such as “The Philosopher and His Shadow” this divergence is not
itself marked out or questioned (Signs 177/223); there is no uneasiness with
respect to Husserl’s texts here.7 That distance Merleau-Ponty only achieves in
his later works and once his reading of Husserl comes to be mediated by other
thinkers (notably Heidegger and Bergson). Most importantly, Merleau-Ponty’s
relation to Husserl can be understood to mediate his relation to his own
thought, with all the vexations and reversals that this implies: Husserl
constitutes not only a privileged point of departure for Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy (whether on the lived body or on time) but also a means for self-
questioning and self-critique.8 Thus as Merleau-Ponty distances himself from
his own early work — specifically from the philosophy of consciousness and
subjectivity and the metaphysics of presence that he comes to discern as
having framed the Phenomenology (VI 183/237, 200/253) — this self-critique
passes progressively through a critical re-reading of Husserl.9
The import of this way of reading Husserl for Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of
time is double. It means not only that Husserl’s phenomenology continues to
inform Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on time, despite his explicit critique of the
Time Lectures in the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible. Although
such continuing influence can be attributed to the shift in Merleau-Ponty’s focus
from the Time Lectures to “The Origin of Geometry”10 — to which Merleau-
Ponty’s later courses and writings are clearly more favourable — I believe that
Merleau-Ponty’s relation to the Time Lectures is a more complex one than such
an interpretation allows. Specifically, Merleau-Ponty’s later critique of the Time
Lectures is accompanied by a working-through and re-conception of Husserlian
notions. The central concepts of Husserl’s time-analyses are not discarded out of
hand. Whether it be the “encasement” or “envelopment” of retentional
intentionality or the potential unconsciousness of “ultimate” consciousness,
these concepts shift and are reconfigured (sometimes in radical and almost
unrecognizable ways) within the later ontology of time that is the flesh.
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It is in this vein that Merleau-Ponty’s appeal, in “The Philosopher and His
Shadow,” to the fecundity of Husserl’s “unthought” can be reread (though the
Time Lectures are not Merleau-Ponty’s focus in that text).11 Not only would
this “unthought” stem from the iterative and self-questioning movement of
Husserl’s time-analyses, but also from the structures of temporality that
Husserl sought to bring to phenomenological description, even when he could
not find adequate formulas to fix them (here Husserl’s reflections on the
nameability and temporality of the “flow” of absolute consciousness come to
mind (PITC 75, 371)). Indeed, to invoke a common theme in Merleau-Ponty’s
reading of Husserl, it is the “failure” to give a complete account and the need
to resume the analysis that are the positive lessons of Husserlian
phenomenology. In other words, the inability to grasp time-consciousness in
an act of intellectual possession demonstrates the excess of its becoming, a
transcendence that cannot be held “as between forceps” (VI 128/170). But it
is because Husserl’s time-analyses bring together divergent tendencies that
they can become the locus for this Merleau-Pontian insight: on the one hand,
we find in Bernet’s words the “dream of the omnipresence of the entire life of
my consciousness on call and at my disposal at any moment” (“Einleitung”,
xlii) — the metaphysics of presence presupposed in Husserl’s insistence on the
absolute self-presence of the consciousness of the “now” and in his disquiet
with respect to forgetting — and, on the other hand, there is a
phenomenological attention to time, an attempt to think it from within, that
belies this dream.12 Though Husserl himself did not work through this tension,
Merleau-Ponty can be seen to take it up in his articulation of time as
“dehiscence” in the Phenomenology and in his attempt to name time without
fixing it in The Visible and the Invisible. Time is, in the latter text, “vortex” (VI
244/298), transcendence without subject or object, and “absence [that] counts
in the world” (VI 228/281).
In what follows, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s later critique and reworking of
Husserl’s time-analyses through the lens of concepts, limitations and concerns
brought to light by Bernet’s reading of these time-analyses in the “Einleitung”.
My argument draws primarily on the working notes to The Visible and the
Invisible, but it is also informed by Merleau-Ponty’s lecture courses on
Institution and Passivity (1954-55).13 Three elements of Bernet’s reading of
Husserl frame my argument: (i) the metaphysics of presence, the “dream of the
omnipresence of ... consciousness” presupposed in Husserl’s analyses
(“Einleitung,” xlii); (ii) retention as non-linear “encasement
[Verschachtelung],” as the splintering or spiralling of time that implies a
certain structural circularity, or in Merleau-Ponty’s terms “simultaneity”
(“Einleitung”, li); and (iii) the problem of forgetting demonstrated at once by
Husserl’s “positivistic horror of the past as the locus of an absolute and
fundamental absence” (“Einleitung”, xlii) and by his reflection on, and
rejection of, the possible unconsciousness of ultimate consciousness
(“Einleitung”, lvi and PITC 382). Since Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy of
time takes its point of departure — as both critique and reconceptualization —
from Husserl’s time-analyses, it will be important to follow the trajectory of
these Husserlian concepts within Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology of the flesh.
My question is: what becomes of the present, retention and forgetting in the
later works? The tentative answer passes through the logic of institution as the
“retrograde movement of the true” and through unconsciousness as
(dis)articulation of the perceptual field, as Merleau-Ponty attempts to detach
Husserlian notions from the philosophy of consciousness and “rehabilitate”
them within an ontology of time.14
I. Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Husserl Early Time-Analyses
The explicit critique of Husserl’s early time-analyses takes place in the
working notes of The Visible and the Invisible. At the centre of this critique we
find Husserl’s time diagram: “Husserl’s diagram is dependent on the
convention that one can represent the series of nows by points on a line.” (VI
195/248, W.N. May 20, 1959) This same diagram of time was appropriated in
a positive sense by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception,
reproduced with a slightly different skew in order to emphasize the sinking
into the past of each now-point and the “thickness” of retention that at once
separates and connects the present to the past (PhP 417/476-7). In that text,
Merleau-Ponty overlooked the rectilinear (PITC 99) and one-dimensional
nature (PITC 380) of the diagram in favor of the non-linear complication
introduced into the diagram by retention — what Bernet has called
“splintering” (“Einleitung,” li) and Merleau-Ponty “dehiscence” (PhP
419/480). Though continuing to recognize the positive import of retentional
intentionality for the understanding of temporality, Merleau-Ponty in The
Visible and the Invisible no longer finds this intentionality sufficient to save
Husserl’s time diagram. This is because Merleau-Ponty has become concerned
with a deeper problem than linearity. Though his critique is aimed at the
“linear conception of time” presented in Husserl’s diagram, as Bernet rightly
notes (“Einleitung,” lxiii), it is also more than this. Specifically, Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of the spatialization of time does not follow Bergson’s account
in Time and Free Will (VI 195/248). For Merleau-Ponty, the error does not lie
in representing time in terms of space, rather it is both spatiality and
temporality that must be reconceived (and his ultimate descriptions of the flesh
emphasize its “spatializing-temporalizing” structure (VI 244/297)). The
problem, in a word, is not merely that of the line but of the point (whether
spatially or temporally conceived).
In the working notes, Merleau-Ponty describes “Husserl’s diagram as a
positivist projection of the vortex of temporal differentiation.” (VI 231/ 284,
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W.N. January 1960) It is the positivity of the present, the now-point of
Husserl’s diagram, that is at issue here. And it is from this representation of the
now-point as self-presence that both the punctuality and abstractness of the
present and the seriality of time emerge as intertwining problems for Merleau-
Ponty.15 At stake here is the metaphysics of presence that undergirds Husserl’s
time-analyses. In “Is the Present Ever Present?”, Bernet notes the importance
for Husserl of maintaining that “the now is, for itself and absolutely, present
now.”16 The self-givenness of the now-point, its immediate perceptual presence
for a primal impressional consciousness, is a metaphysical conviction that is
reiterated in Husserl’s time-analyses, even when it is belied by his
phenomenological descriptions. For Merleau-Ponty, this is more than a
question of privileging the present (though it is also that); it is a misconstrual
of the nature of the present, the consequences of which freeze the passage and
flow of time. The assumption of full self-presence makes the present into a
self-contained and sufficient moment, a source-point that coincides with
itself.17 Such a point persists in itself, but has no internal reason for passing.
By attributing absolute presence to the present, it becomes inconceivable that
this present can itself pass. It can only become past by means of an external
pressure, another present that competes with it and that pushes it out of
existence — or, more precisely, out of the grasp of the consciousness of the
“now.” Thus Merleau-Ponty asks of Husserl: “Is it the new present, in its
individuality, that pushes the preceding one into the past, and that fills a part
of the future?” (VI 190/244) Merleau-Ponty notes that “the upsurge of time
would be incomprehensible as the creation of a supplement of time that would
push the whole preceding series back into the past. That passivity is not
conceivable” (VI 184/237). Indeed, according to Merleau-Ponty, this was
precisely what Husserl’s appeal to the auto-constitution of the flow of absolute
consciousness attempted, yet failed, to avoid (184/237). Ultimately, this
picture would make of the present “a segment of time with defined contours
that would come and set itself in place” (VI 184/238); it would be “a field
defined by the objective diaphragm” (VI 196/249), where the present content
were wholly positive and fully given to consciousness and the past an
“occultation” or negation of this content (194/248).18 Time would then be
defined as a series of punctual Abschattungen, a succession of self-contained
moments that push each other out of presence.19
Significantly, this picture misses the passage of the present, since the
implication of the past in the present — their internal interdependence — is
elided. The relation of past and present remains one of externality. It is such
an aporia that defines Husserl’s treatment of the relationship between primal
impression and retention for Bernet: “the two are separated in an original form
of ‘externality’ in which each pole presupposes the other, yet neither can be
derived from the other.” (“Einleitung,” lv) It is for this reason, I believe, that
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Merleau-Ponty no longer finds the addition of retentional intentionality to be
sufficient to mitigate the punctuality and seriality of the Husserlian diagram.
Unless the past is recognized as internally necessary to the definition of the
present, and retention co-conditional for the consciousness of the primal
impression, the import of retention is lost. For Merleau-Ponty, retentional
intentionality should be understood to restructure the flow; Husserl’s time-
analyses can only recognize its supplementation and “splintering” at points.
By founding time-consciousness in the self-presence of a source-point — the
primal impressional consciousness or consciousness of the “now” — Husserl
relegates retention to the role of an “appendage or relic, a ‘comet’s tail’”
(“Einleitung”, lv).20 The implications of retention are not thought through.
Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl’s time diagram carries the reflection on
the “now-point” farther. His argument is not only that the knife-edged present,
or now-point, cannot be said to exist since it constitutes an idealized
abstraction (as Derrida will later argue). His argument is that Husserl has
underestimated the import not only of retention but also of the now-point
itself. For Merleau-Ponty, a point is more than merely a “point.” I find three
senses in which this can be understood from the working notes. First, a point
is already a relief or Gestalt. He notes that “it is the Cartesian idealization
applied to the mind as to the things (Husserl) that has persuaded us that we
were a flux of individual Erlebnisse, whereas we are a field of Being. Even in
the present, the landscape is a configuration.” (VI 240/293) This is not only
because there are no isolated points or figures in the perceptual field, but also
because to be seen as a “point” is to deploy the differences within the
perceptual field so that a certain figure becomes prominent while others
remain implicit. The point relies for its visibility upon systems of diacritical
difference — not only upon other points but also lines, colours and depth.
Second, the now-point is already passage. The present is always elsewhere (or
else-when) than where I look. It is unlocalizable as a fixed point, “ungraspable
from close-up, in the forceps of attention” (VI 195/249); “one knows that it is
not there, that it was just there, one never coincides with it” (VI 184/238).
Though it may seem that this understanding of the now-point would motivate
Merleau-Ponty to conceive it as a disintegrating or evanescent presence, his
conception of the present in fact proceeds in the opposite direction, expanding
it to a cycle “with indecisive contours” (VI 184/238), as we shall see in section
two. Third, a spatio-temporal point is an event that, as it passes, opens up a
future for other points. Since Merleau-Ponty does not subscribe to a formal
understanding of the now-point, taken apart from its “content,” the now-point
must already be understood to inscribe a style or way of being. In other words,
a point is already a direction or dimension, “a centre of forces”.21 The point
does not persist in itself, but is difference within a spatio-temporal field and
the transformation of that field. 
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What the working notes offer, by means of these three senses of the point,
is a reconceptualization of the now-point. I would thus claim that Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of Husserl’s early time-analyses not only uncovers the ideal
of self-presence upon which the edifice of time-consciousness is constructed
(the “dream of the omnipresence of ... consciousness” to which Bernet points
(“Einleitung”, xlii)), but also seeks to provide an alternative. In abandoning the
dream of self-presence, the Husserlian now-point is not evacuated, but
reinscribed as transcendence. Significantly, the now-point is no longer defined
as presence to an actually-existing mode of consciousness (or to a subject, as
in the Phenomenology of Perception). Rather, the now-point is at the cusp of a
transcendence that surpasses the subject, and that cannot be encompassed by
consciousness. It belongs to the ontological movement, the temporalization, of
the flesh.
In response to this Merleau-Pontian critique, it may be objected that Husserl’s
time-analyses rely precisely on the distinction between now-point and primal
impressional consciousness that Merleau-Ponty appears to elide. Though now-
points are organized according to a succession in immanent time, and hence can
appear to trace a linear path, Husserl came to realize that the structure of time-
constituting consciousness could not be likewise described as a “succession.”
(PITC 333) Rather, in the last group of the time-analyses (Bernet’s group four,
texts from September 1909 to end of 1911), absolute consciousness is
characterized as a “being-all-at-once” of two sorts, which make possible the
experiences of succession and of simultaneity. (PITC 77-78, 374) Though this
“being-all-at-once” cannot be properly called “simultaneity” any more than
“succession” (PITC 375-6), since such terms can only be used to speak of
immanent time within Husserl’s schema, Husserl nevertheless appears to be
trying to describe a structural coexistence of impressional and retentional
consciousness in the actuality phase of consciousness. This structural
coexistence is not static but “makes up the moving moment of the actuality of
consciousness” that is the “flow” of absolute consciousness (PITC 378).
Appealing to the primal impressional consciousness does not, however,
mitigate Merleau-Ponty’s critique. The “philosophy of consciousness” is the
locus of repeated and generalized criticism in the working notes to The Visible
and the Invisible — not only as it is presupposed in Husserl’s time-analyses
and other texts but also as it works to frame many of the analyses of the
Phenomenology of Perception.22 The reconceptualization of the present, to
which I have pointed, works to recuperate the insights of the time-analyses by
shifting the account of temporality away from this philosophy of
consciousness. This shift of attention is not therefore a misreading on
Merleau-Ponty’s part, but an effort at philosophical rehabilitation. In order to
see this, it is necessary to turn briefly to the critique of the philosophy of
consciousness as it has to do with time. In a particularly rich working note,
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Merleau-Ponty observes that “[t]he intentional analytic tacitly assumes a place
of absolute contemplation from which the intentional explicitation is made,
and which could embrace present, past, and even openness towards the future.”
(VI 243/297, W.N. April 1960) The problem is precisely that the “being-all-at-
once” of time, what Merleau-Ponty calls the “past-present ‘simultaneity’” (VI
243/297), is contained within the immanence of consciousness. In this
schema, whatever is, or was, must present itself to a consciousness that grasps
it in full self-presence (primal impression) or as an absence that derives from
a former presence (retention). To rehabilitate primal impression and retention
it is necessary to think them not as acts of consciousness — even if non-
objectivating, as in the case of Husserl’s notion of horizontal retentional
intentionality [Längsintentionalität] — but to think them as “intentionality
without acts” (VI 238/292), or more precisely as “intentionality within
being.”23 This intentionality is not a property of a consciousness to which the
now-point must become present, but “the thread that binds” the now-point to
its own past and future (VI 173/227). It is the temporal becoming or
transcendence of the now-point itself, a transcendence that cannot be fully
encompassed in any consciousness.24
The aim of Merleau-Ponty’s critique is, then, to think the past and the
present without reducing them to the “consciousness of the past” and the
“consciousness of the present.” At the centre of the critique is Husserl’s
constitutive analysis which traces the being of the past and of the present back
to time-constituting consciousness. This constituting consciousness Merleau-
Ponty elsewhere describes as “the philosopher’s professional impostor” (Signs
180/227); instead of disclosing the secret structure of time, this consciousness
is an “artefact” that the presumptive teleology of philosophical reflection
projects back onto the flow (180/227). In contrast, Merleau-Ponty maintains
that “it is indeed the past that adheres to the present and not the consciousness
of the past that adheres to the consciousness of the present: the ‘vertical’ past
contains in itself the exigency to have been perceived, far from the
consciousness of having perceived bearing that of the past.” (VI 244/297) There
is a weight to the past, and to the present that passes, that make a difference in
time and whose reverberations can be felt, even when the present involves
unconsciousness and the past remains forgotten; in other words, they are
“absences” that count in the world. The “simultaneity” or adherence of the past
to the present is a structure that Husserl’s intentional analysis failed to grasp, a
structure that was implicit within his description of the “flow” as Merleau-
Ponty reads it.25 I believe that Bernet points to this concentric structure when he
describes the way “each new retention ripples through the whole of time-
consciousness like a stone cast into the water.” (“Einleitung”, li) It is this
simultaneity that Merleau-Ponty tries to think through in his later philosophy of
time — insisting that it is neither fusion without differentiation (a position he
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attributes to Bergson), nor the juxtaposition of external moments (Husserl). Not
unlike Husserl’s hesitations in naming the “flow” of absolute consciousness,
Merleau-Ponty searches for images and concepts through which the internal
implication of past and present, and hence the simultaneity that structures time,
can be glimpsed. Though it is unclear that any of these concepts can be taken
as final (or that such completion is even possible), I will examine two such
schemas below: Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to Bergson’s “retrograde movement of
the true” (section two) and, in a move surprisingly reminiscent of the
Phenomenology, to the Gestalt of the perceptual field (section three).
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the philosophy of consciousness as framework
for thinking time stems not only from the paucity of its representation of past
and present, but also from its inability to do justice to the structure of time as
past-present “simultaneity.” My reading of Merleau-Ponty is hence informed
by two concerns overlooked by the philosophy of consciousness, lacunae that
Bernet discerns in Husserl’s account of the past in the time-analyses
(“Einleitung”, xlii). On the one hand, there is the “circularity” of time that can
be seen in the historical becoming of the past, its power to take on new
meaning after the fact and to thus reconfigure, and be reconfigured by, the
present (section two). And, on the other hand, there is the problem of
forgetting, not only as the insinuation of discontinuity and absence into what
could have been an “omnipresent” intentional life, but as a structural absence
that makes perception possible for Merleau-Ponty (section three).
II. Retention, the Present and the “Retrograde Movement of the True”
Merleau-Ponty’s lecture course on Institution (1954-55) opens with a re-
reading of Husserlian primal impression that will be accompanied by a radical
rethinking of retention. Merleau-Ponty observes Husserl’s hesitation between,
on the one hand, conceiving the primal impression according to the schema of
apprehension-apprehension content26 and, on the other hand, understanding it
as Urempfindung “where I am surpassed, [because I feel the] thickness of the
sensible, of the present, the thing itself.”27 The present is a surpassing not only
in the sense in which it is something new, and hence not immediately
perceived as a recognizable object, but also, as we learn later in the lecture
course, in the sense in which it is an event that only comes to have its meaning
post-factually. Since the present does not have its meaning in itself, retentional
intentionality cannot be a matter of simply holding onto the former present and
conserving its meaning as it was without loss. Rather, in both the Institution
Lectures and The Visible and the Invisible, retention is rethought by Merleau-
Ponty in a way that allows for the openness of the present and the historical
becoming of the past.
In this vein, Merleau-Ponty appeals to Bergson’s conception of the
“retrograde movement of the true” from La pensée et le mouvant (cf. IP 91-
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94; VI 189/243; VI 240/294).28 For Bergson, this is the anachronistic process
by which an event appears to have pre-existed its emergence, or a judgment its
dated formulation. An event or judgment is thus taken to be possible — in a
form that was fully defined and worked-out — prior to its actualization.29 This
movement involves the retrospective projection onto the past of that which
happens in the present. In other words, the past is reconfigured and redefined
according to the present; it is seen as already containing the possibility of the
current present, as having been its nascent equivalent. For Bergson, this
retrospective movement is a mirage or illusion that makes us believe that the
truth pre-dates its emergence, that it is the discovery of an eternal essence.30
This at once misunderstands the difference in kind between past and present,
taking the past as a modality of the present, and elides the unpredictable
novelty of duration that cannot be captured within the mirrored schema of the
possible and the real.
But Merleau-Ponty finds in the “retrograde movement of the true” precisely
the logic of historicity and truth that Bergson thought lacking. It is the
“automatic” rippling back of the present,31 the reverberation by which “a now
presents itself as pre-existing itself” (IP 94), that Merleau-Ponty appropriates
from Bergson and, I believe, uses to rethink retention. Bergson does, after all,
sometimes speak as if this projection were not merely an error of the intellect,
but a movement that was produced by the very passage of the present: “By the
simple fact of realizing itself, reality projects its shadow behind itself onto the
indefinitely remote past.”32 For Merleau-Ponty, then, “there is really retrograde
movement of the true (and not only retroactive effect of the discovery of the
true).” (IP 91) This is to say that the meaning of the present is not given to a
constituting consciousness; rather, the present institutes itself by means of its
temporal propagation, its transcendence (IP 37). This propagation is, for
Merleau-Ponty, the true meaning of the auto-constitution of time that Husserl
theorized.33 On this model, retentional encasement would not be a matter of
holding onto and conserving, albeit in the mode of presentification, the series
of former presents as they sink continually into the past (“Einleitung,” l-li).
The past is not the same but absent; rather the past is transformed, takes on
new sense, through its intentional relation to the new present.
More precisely, it should be noted that this temporal propagation has a
double directionality, giving time a “circular” or cyclical structure in Merleau-
Ponty’s later thought. In this context, Merleau-Ponty uses Bergson’s
“retrograde movement of the true” to articulate the logic of “institution,” a
term that translates his version of the Husserlian notion of Stiftung (IP 91-
94).34 The circularity of time is encapsulated in a note to the Institution
lectures: the present, Merleau-Ponty says, “has to become what it is [a à
devenir ce qu’il est]” (IP 36, marginal note). On the one hand, the passing of
the present, its institution, means the “opening of a field” (IP 38) To be precise,
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it is by becoming past that the present installs a field or dimension according
to which a certain future is opened up. The promise of the primal impression,
and of le sentir generally, is to “become ‘level’ or dimension” (VI 239/292);
to use Husserlian terms, the retention of a former primal impression protends
a certain future. Merleau-Ponty notes:
Thus institution [means] [the] laying down in an experience [...] of dimensions (in the general
Cartesian sense: system of reference), in relation to which a whole series of other experiences
will have a meaning and will form a sequel, a history. The meaning is deposited [...] But not
as an object in the cloakroom, as mere remainder or survival, as residue: [it is there] as to be
continued, to be completed without this sequel being determined. (IP 38)
Thus the past present — the event become field or dimension which
Merleau-Ponty also calls the “dimensional present” (VI 244/297) — outlines
a future of sense (Signs 72/91). Though this future is made possible by the
past, it is neither causally determined by it, nor a mere realization of it.
Possibility, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a retrospective copy of the real; it is the
fecundity and power (puissance) of polymorphous Being to give rise to ever
new dimensions of sense — systems of diacritical difference — according to
which it can be seen, though not wholly given (VI 252/306). The forward
movement of institution is hence at once openness to a future, but also the
circumscription of that future according to the field that the former present has
instituted. Openness to the future inscribes a structural blind spot or limitation
that derives from the very contingency and facticity of the former present that
has made it possible. Thus, though “any entity can be accentuated as an
emblem of Being” (VI 270/323, commenting on Freud), it is nevertheless the
case that openness to Being henceforth takes place through this entity. The
forward movement of institution outlines a form of continuity that is not an
illusion for Merleau-Ponty; the future is undetermined, but neither arbitrary
nor unmotivated.
On the other hand, there is the backward movement of institution, the
“retrograde movement of the true.” Here, new events opened up by the former
present are projected back onto that present, giving it its sense. It is in this way
that the present becomes what it is. The meaning of the former present was not
given in itself, but is the effect of the retrospective reverberations (or ripples)
of the future, now present, that it has made possible. Importantly, this meaning
is always mediated through other events (though not necessarily ordered in a
stepwise mediation), so that this meaning is neither closed nor complete. In
this sense, historical becoming is inscribed within the being of the past for
Merleau-Ponty. Not only does the present have its meaning in passing, but as
past it is constantly rewritten. Indeed, we may say that the present has its
meaning only in the mode of the “will have been” [va avoir été] (VI 189/243).
It is the very dimensionality and polymorphism of the flesh, which Merleau-
Ponty’s account assumes, that dictates this non-closure and re-inscription of
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the past. Since no dimension can be considered exhaustive, and since the
diacriticality of dimensions implies their constant self-differentiation (a
diachrony that reorganizes their synchrony), the institution of a dimension, as
well as its constant shift, will mean that the past is reconfigured so that it
reveals another historical sense. Though this historical meaning often appears
as an elaboration of what the past was, it sometimes reveals an alternative
sense of the past, “inassimilable” to prior dimensions (IP 250). It would be an
error to understand this reconfiguration as a reconstruction of the past; the
meaning that the past comes to have is not a retrospective illusion but neither
is it explicitly contained in the past in itself (IP 251). Rather, this is the
historical coming to expression of the multi-vocal and “overdetermined”
events of the past itself (VI 240-241/294).
The forward and backward temporal movements of institution, that make
the present what it is, do not coincide or come to rest there. This is not only
because the sense of the present is always elsewhere, as past dimensionality
and future possibility; it is also that the circle — through which the present-
become-past opens a future and the future-become-present reconfigures the
past — is not closed. Neither past nor future can be exhaustively given, but
what is more troubling here for the Husserlian theory of time-consciousness is
that the present is not immediately or fully given. The present not only passes,
it becomes. The self-presence of the present is mediated by means of both
retentional intentionality and the protentions that retention calls for.35 Re-
reading the Husserlian concept of retention, Merleau-Ponty notes that “the
absolute present which I am is as if it were not” (VI 191/244). Yet the present
is not nothing for Merleau-Ponty. Although the model of institution implies
“the influence of the ‘contents’ on time which passes” (VI 184/238) — so that
the present cannot be attributed a homogeneous and constant form and is far
from being an “objective diaphragm” (VI 196/249) — it is through the very
circularity of time that the present can be understood. The present is variable
and situated; only as past for a future does the present become something.
Hence the present is “a cycle defined by a central and dominant region and
with indecisive contours — a swelling [gonflement] or bulb [ampoule] of
time.” (VI 184/238) In this context, it may be accurate to speak of time as
spiralling, as Bernet suggests in the “Einleitung” (li). Indeed, in the working
notes to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the image of a
“vortex” [tourbillon] (VI 244/298) to describe the spatializing-temporalizing
structure of the flesh, but he also speaks, in another context, of a “stroboscopic
spiral” (VI 264/317). That the “spiral” is stroboscopic is not without
significance for the notion of the present; for the present is then “like the point
of [the spiral] which is who knows where” (264/317), which cannot be located
if we search to fix it, but which is revealed in passing as having already
transcended us.
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This rethinking of the present is central to Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology
of time. But what does it mean for the Husserlian notion of retention?
Merleau-Ponty’s reworking of retention as “retrograde movement of the true”
takes seriously Husserl’s occasional admissions in the time-analyses that the
primal impression requires retention in order to come to presence itself and
that the constitution of the “now” needs the consciousness of the past —
directions in Husserl’s time-analyses to which Bernet has pointed in his
work.36 But Merleau-Ponty’s reworking of retention ultimately also breaks
with a central element of Husserl’s account of retention. What is at stake is the
Husserlian investment in retention as the guarantee for the omnipresent
continuity and memorial repeatability of the life of consciousness, and in
“memory as the most faithful reproduction possible of a past perception”
(“Einleitung”, xlii). I believe that Merleau-Ponty breaks with this picture in
two ways. First, in taking the “retrograde movement of the true” to be the very
movement of the temporality of events and not a mere retrospective illusion,
Merleau-Ponty conceives of retentional intentionality as the propagation of
sense. Retention does not conserve the past, modified as the absence of a
former presence, but opens up the past to historical transformation and to the
expression of “a sense it did not yet have in original-present experience”
(“Einleitung,” xlii). This belies the Husserlian dream of a past fully accessible
and recuperable by means of the continuous encasement of retentional
intentionality. The past is not simply pushed back in retention yet held onto as
the same past; the ripples of retentional encasement must be understood as
reconfigurations according to which hitherto invisible dimensions of the past
come to the surface.
Second, in Merleau-Ponty’s account, the opening of the future that the
retention of a passing present makes possible is not simply a confirmation of
the continuity of intentional life but a transformation of that life. This speaks to
a limitation of Husserl’s theory of memory that Bernet examines in La vie du
sujet. Bernet notes that his conviction of the continuity and coherence of the life
of consciousness leads Husserl to conceive the future as the confirmation of this
continuity, without recognizing the necessity for deformation and loss. This
means not only that forgetting is accidental, but also that it can be reconquered
in acts of recollection. It is this ideal repeatability of the past — its accessibility
as it was for a former primal impressional consciousness — that retention
protends on Husserl’s account. The future for which retention calls is, then, a
future that is made up of acts of recollection in which what has been retained is
reproduced and felt to coincide with the present that it was.37 It is this dream of
the immediate givenness to consciousness of the present as it is — and of its
subsequent and continuous accessibility through retention — that makes
forgetting a difficulty for Husserl’s time-analyses, as Merleau-Ponty comes to
realize in The Visible and the Invisible.
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III. The Problem of Forgetting
In the working note where he discusses Husserl’s time diagram (see section
one), Merleau-Ponty broaches the problem of forgetting in Husserl’s Time
Lectures: “The problem of forgetting: lies essentially in the fact that it is
discontinuous.” (VI 194-5/248, W.N. May 20, 1959) As Merleau-Ponty is well
aware, Husserl’s early time-analyses can only account for forgetting in terms
of the shrinking of the temporal horizon, the fading-away of remote retentions
as they become more and more distant from the actual phase of consciousness
(PITC 361-2). Forgetting, then, is an ordered phenomenon. More so, it is a
contingent loss that is recuperable, for it is always in principle possible to
recover these remote retentions in a present act of recollection (though the
accuracy of a recollection may sometimes be in doubt). Merleau-Ponty’s own
attempt to deal with forgetting in the Phenomenology of Perception remains
close to this Husserlian account. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty understands
oblivion as the limit of the retentional chain (PhP 423/483-4); on the other
hand, he attempts to supplement the Husserlian framework with an account of
forgetting that assimilates it to an intentional act, performed in bad faith, by
which memory continues to be possessed but is held at a distance (PhP
162/189).
By the time of the lecture course on Passivity (cotemporaneous with that on
Institution, 1954-55), Merleau-Ponty realizes that the problem of forgetting is
badly posed if it is understood as an accidental inability to remember, or a loss
that can be overcome (IP 256). Such an approach deals with forgetting by
evacuating what is most difficult, or unsettling, about it. It betrays, as Bernet
notes of Husserl, “a positivistic horror of the past as the locus of an absolute
and fundamental absence, of an inexorable withdrawal and an irreplaceable
loss” (“Einleitung”, xlii).38 Merleau-Ponty’s insight, in this regard, is to see
forgetting not as a problem to be solved, but as a necessary and original
structure of time (IP 256-7). It is in this vein that Merleau-Ponty’s response to
Husserl in the working note cited above can be understood: “But it is not so:
there are retentions that are not forgotten, even very remote ones. There are
fragments ‘perceived’ just now, that disappear (have they been perceived? And
what exactly is the relation between the perceived and the imperceived?)” (VI
194f/248) This points the direction in which Merleau-Ponty seeks to think
forgetting; for to take forgetting as originary means, for Merleau-Ponty, to
understand its role within perception. The consequence is that forgetting is no
longer understood as a loss but as a negativity that is generative of the
perceptual field (VI 228/281) — as an originary absence, imperception or
blind spot within the present (VI 247/300).39
This approach to forgetting that understands it as an unconsciousness which
would reside within the present, or actual phase of consciousness, is not
wholly alien to Husserl’s time-analyses. Such unconsciousness is the fate of
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the “ultimate consciousness” of which Husserl dreams in the final text
included in Husserliana X (“Einleitung”, lvi, PITC no. 54). There Husserl
speculates that “an ultimate consciousness that controls all consciousness in
the flow” (PITC 382) might allow the flow to be grasped in its entirety (rather
than only as past), so that constituting and constituted could finally coincide
(381). But if an infinite regress is to be avoided, then such a consciousness
cannot become the object of attention of another consciousness; it is hence
ultimate and constituting, but also unconscious (on Husserl’s terms). Though
this thought-experiment seems to take place principally as an afterthought in
the time-analyses, and although Husserl finally rejects the possibility of such
an “‘unconscious’ consciousness” (PITC 382), this line of thinking is one that
Merleau-Ponty takes up, and radically reworks, in his later philosophy.
Specifically, it is by bringing unconsciousness into the heart of perception that
Merleau-Ponty is able to think the “simultaneity” of past and present, which
he criticized Husserl for neglecting.
For Merleau-Ponty, then, forgetting “is to be sought in vision itself:
memory will be understood only by means of it.” (VI 194/247, W.N. May 20,
1959) What Merleau-Ponty proposes is not simply a schematization of time on
the model of perception. The reductiveness of such an approach was already
evident in Husserl’s hesitations with respect to the application of the
apprehension-apprehension content schema in the context of time-
consciousness — as Bernet has clearly shown (“Einleitung”, xlviii, PITC 322-
3) and as Merleau-Ponty realizes in the Phenomenology (PhP 152n/178n).40 In
The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty’s aim is not only to understand
temporality by means of perception, but also to rethink perception according
to the structuring role that forgetting plays in visibility. It is by means of this
double revision that Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology of the visible is also an
ontology of time.
The crucial move is to no longer take forgetting as belonging to the
interiority of the subject, and hence as posing a problem for a philosophy of
consciousness that aims at omnipresence. Forgetting is, rather, understood to
belong to the structure of the flesh. The equation of temporality with
subjectivity that was dominant in the Phenomenology of Perception is hence
revealed to be a subjectivism that misconstrues time; to say, in the
Phenomenology’s confident phrase, that “we are it” is to reduce past and
present to their representations for a subject (PhP 430/492). But temporality is
not a transcendence that belongs to a subject. It is rather the transcendence, or
surpassing, of the subject by a spatializing-temporalizing flesh to which that
subject belongs. It is hence more accurate to say that we are of time, than that
we are time (to use an oft recurring expression of the later work). More
specifically, since the flesh is thought first and foremost through visibility,
forgetting becomes for Merleau-Ponty a function of that contact between body
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and world, that folding upon itself of visible flesh, which is perception. It is
therefore within the perceptual field that forgetting is to be located.
Merleau-Ponty notes that “the unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom
of ourselves, behind the back of our ‘consciousness,’ but in front of us, as
articulations of our field.” (VI 180/234) More precisely, I find implicit in
Merleau-Ponty’s later work three ways in which the perceptual field involves
a structural unconscious or invisible, a form of originary forgetting. First, the
unconscious is the level or dimension according to which one perceives; “[f]or
one perceives only figures upon levels — And one perceives them only in
relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived.” (VI 189/243) It is in this
sense that consciousness is “ignorance of itself, imperception” (VI 213/267),
for it forgets the level or dimension that makes it see. Indeed, it must forget
this level, not see it, in order to see according to it.41 This is a forgetting of the
past that coexists with perception and makes it possible (it corresponds to the
former present become dimension or level, described in section two). The
forgetting of the past stems, in this sense, from my “inherence” in it (VI
227/281). Here, consciousness is understood to require the differentiation of
the Gestalt structure,42 while the unconscious is this differentiation itself; the
unconscious is between figure and ground (VI 189/243). More precisely, the
unconscious past is the instituted system of diacritical difference according to
which the very separation of figure and ground comes to be defined. It is in
this way that past and present are “simultaneous” for Merleau-Ponty (VI
267/321), and that retention can be understood as the “inner framework
[membrure]” (VI 215/269) or depth of the perceptual field (VI 219/273).
This points, however, to a second sense of forgetting, a sense that leaves its
mark on the working note cited at the beginning of this section. There
Merleau-Ponty says: “understand perception as differentiation, forgetting as
undifferentiation” (VI 197/250, W.N. May 20, 1959). Although this
undifferentiation seems, at first, to simply be the result of a lack of separation,
specifically that of figure-ground — and hence a fusion that destroys the past
— the reading of the past in section two suggests another interpretation. The
“undifferentiation” of the past would not be lack of difference, but the
multiplication of differences that connect laterally and non-oppositionally,
without selection. The past would be a polymorphous, multi-vocal and over-
determined matrix, a “mixed life” that can suggest divergent futures (IP 269).
Thus the first sense of forgetting, by means of which a former present is
instituted as the dimension according to which I perceive, relies on another
forgetting. The instituted or “dimensional” past, which is refracted back
through the process of actualization it has motivated, remains a circumscribed
past (one that circumscribes a corresponding future, as we have seen in section
two). There is in this “retrograde movement,” by which the dimensional past
is formed, a foreclosure of other dimensions or systems of difference
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suggested within the past itself but unperceived in the absolute sense. There
would be, in this regard, an originally forgotten past that exceeds any given
version of the instituted past and that is more than what is given or operative
in the present.
Although Merleau-Ponty shies away from such “absolute invisibility” or
“pure transcendence” in The Visible and the Invisible, mentioning it only
rarely (VI 229/282, 254/308), Derrida has pointed to its trace in that text.43
Such an absence that is felt but that cannot be indexed through perception,
even in its retrospective and prospective play, may require an account that goes
beyond perception. This would point, to use Merleau-Ponty’s terms, to a
“simultaneity” that is also an asymmetry or irreversibility — to what he
evocatively calls “the time before time” (VI 243/296). In this second sense,
forgetting would be the very inaccessibility, difference or transcendence of the
past, that which makes it past and which means that there is no possibility of
coinciding with it in recollection (IP 258). Here, the past transcends me not
only because of my inherence in it — because it is “too close” — but because
this inherence means that my access to the past is always mediated through
one of its dimensions, a dimension that dictates its own invisibility. This
second sense of forgetting is hence also a double forgetfulness: it is not only a
forgetting of the dimension through which I perceive, but also a forgetting of
the self-erasure that its function as dimension dictates and thus of the partiality
of this dimension itself. This, in turn, implies a third structural blind spot of
perception that contributes to the discontinuity of forgetting (and to the
structure of time as “stroboscopic spiral”). For, though every new present
forms a “coherent deformation” with respect to an already established level, or
dimensional past (VI 262/315), so some presents are “inassimilable” to the
instituted dimension (IP 250). Such a present is hence not only “divergence
with respect to a norm of meaning, difference” (IP 41), but registers as
nonsense with respect to that norm — as the “disarticulation” of the previous
order (VI 197/250). It is in this additional sense that a new present may involve
an initial, structural blindness of consciousness (VI 225/278).
There is, finally, a risk in Merleau-Ponty’s project of rethinking perception
and time by means of one another. For it means that invisibility often takes on
the role of a proxy for forgetting, without the relation between different forms
of forgetting, or that between perception and memory, being sufficiently
addressed in the text. Though Merleau-Ponty makes clear that the “invisible”
of which he speaks is not of one sole kind, that invisibility is heterogeneous
and points to a multiplicity of structures (VI 257/310-11), by conceiving
forgetting according to the dimensionality of the sensible and the Gestalt
structure of the perceptual field, its “pure transcendence” may be missed. This
echoes a critique that Bernet levels against Husserl’s earlier time-analyses, but
that he finds mitigated in the final texts when retention is no longer thought
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according to the model of perception (“Einleitung”, xlix-l). It is difficult to
know whether the unfinished text of The Visible and the Invisible is moving in
the direction of an “invisibility” that can be thought beyond the analogy to
sensible being. The visible, in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, continues to provide
the measure according to which all other phenomena or structures of the flesh
are understood; there is here a “dictatorship of the visible,” one could say (IP
209). That a non-reductive “mixed or hybrid life” — to use a term from
Bernet’s recent work — would be possible within Merleau-Ponty’s ontology
of the flesh is hinted at by Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis that “invisibility” is
heterogeneous, that a unified ground cannot be recovered, and by the attempt
in the final pages of the manuscript of The Visible and the Invisible to think
flesh “beyond the circle of the visible” (VI 144/189).44 What such a
“métissage”45 would mean for an ontology of time that seeks to take seriously
the simultaneity of the past with the present, but also its inaccessibility and
forgetting, I have tried to give a glimpse of in this text.
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